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Abstract 
In this paper, the author explores the reception of the non-human living beings in modern 
philosophical and practical approaches. The analysis is aimed at examining both the views 
of the representatives of classical anthropocentrism, as well as the theses of the 
representatives of various non-anthropocentric teachings. Anthropocentrism is, in short, a 
worldview that is based on Aristotle's vision of man as a special being among other natural 
beings. Advocates of the questioning of the dominant anthropocentric perspective of the 
cosmos, on the other hand, are trying to establish the new relation by relativizing of the 
difference between humans and non-human living beings, by attributing specifically 
human qualities and categories, such as dignity, moral status and rights, as well as feelings, 
memories, communication, consciousness and thinking to non-human living beings. Non-
anthropocentrists, consequently, believe that it is necessary to relax the usual strict 
hierarchy among beings in nature, that is, the discrediting of animals in relation to man, 
and that within the applied ethics, alias bioethics, it is possible, even necessary, to establish 
the "animal ethics". 
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The dominant anthropocentric image of the world,2 and the ensuing 
consequentialist relation of man to nature and animals,3 has been questioned over the 
last decades by non-anthropocentric expansion of ethics, and by ever louder posing of 
(bio)ethical demands for a fundamental and new settlement of relations between 
humans and animals. If one attempts to summarize the basic views of the leading 
authors P. Singer,4 T. Regan5 and K. M. Meyer-Abich,6 which are representative of 
present discussions of the new regulation of human-animal relationships, then the 
main views are as follows: 
1.) Animals are beings that are capable of suffering7, with their own interests 
and needs that are similar to the basic needs of people. 
2.) If there is such similarity, the principle of equality requires that the interests 
of animals are respected as well as the similar interests of humans. 
3.) Animals have their own value, which for some (Singer and Regan) stems 
from their consciousness, while others (Meyer-Abich) attribute additional importance 
to the affinity of animals and humans. 
 
2 About Aristotle's paragraph from the Politics (1256b15-22) which is emphasized as a paradigm of the 
leading western tradition and its unquestionable anthropocentrism, consult: Ž. Kaluđerović, 
„Aristotelovo razmatranje logosa, „volje” i odgovornosti kod životinja”, pp. 311-321, in: Filozofska 
istraživanja, 122, god. 31, sv. 2, Zagreb 2011. 
3 In Article 5, point 13 of the „Zakon o dobrobiti životinja Republike Srbije” ("Law on Animal Welfare 
of the Republic of Serbia"), for example, "animal" is defined reductively but unambiguously as any 
vertebrate which has a capacity to feel pain, suffering, fear and stress. Internet address: 
http://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_dobrobiti_zivotinja.html. For more details see: Ž. 
Kaluđerović, "Animal Protection and Welfare - Contemporary Examinations", forthcoming. 
4 P. Singer, Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, New York 2011; P. Singer, Writings on an 
Ethical Life, HarperCollins Publishers Inc., New York 2001. 
5 T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, University of California Press, Berkeley 2004; T. Regan, All 
That Dwell Therein, University of California Press, Berkeley 1982. 
6 K. M. Meyer-Abich, Praktische Naturphilosophie, C. H. Beck, München 1997; K. M. Meyer-Abich, 
Wege zum Frieden mit der Natur, Hanser, München und Wien 1984. 
7 At the end of the well-known passage about the non-human part of animal creatures, which, as is often 
stated, is a departure from the mainstream of Western philosophy, J. Bentham says: "The question is 
not Can they reason?”, or Can they talk?” but Can they suffer?". Consult: J. Bentham, An      
Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 144. Internet address: 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/bentham1780.pdf. 
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Singer talks about animals - "personalities", and Regan about "subjects of life". 
Both of them derive from that the "rights" of animals8 on the basis of their type of 
treatment and protection of their lives, which is why it is forbidden to kill them for the 
purpose of eating.9 Meyer-Abich speaks of the "dignity" of animals, and from that 
derives the "rights" of animals, which prohibit the keeping of animals in massive 
farming, but not the killing of animals after a life that was suitable for an animal, for 
the purpose of feeding people. It is noted that these basic thoughts are partially 
overlapping, but also that the results diverge at the central point of killing of animals. 
Is it enough if Meyer-Abich, in order to explain his opinion, indicates that the 
condition of our existence to live from the rest of our lives, and that, in the end, 
vegetarians also eat life by eating plant foods?10 Is it advisable when Regan, in order 
to explain his contrary opinion, indicates that all mammals have an "inherent value"11 
that makes them "subjects of life" because of their consciousness, thereby providing 
them with "rights" in which man should not interfere, with the exception of severe 
cases of conflict like the necessary defence? 
In order to ensure that the demands for higher or lower own "rights" of animals, 
would not remain only calls without any prospect of success, it should be clarified to 
what extent they are compatible with the usual thinking about (bio)ethics, and to what 
extent they can be realized in practical and political frameworks. In other words, what 
is lost and whether anything is lost, if the "dignity" of animals and the corresponding 
animal "rights" are also recognized in addition to human dignity12 and human rights. 
From the philosophical aspect, at the first glance understandably tense 
situation greatly diminishes, since most western philosophers have believed and/or 
believes that, as already mentioned, only human beings have moral dignity, given that 
 
8 See: B. Sirilnik, E de Fontene, P. Singer, I životinje imaju prava, Akademska knjiga, Novi Sad 2018, 
pp. 15-97. 
9 J. R. des Jardin states critical views on Singer's and Regan's views. Dž. R. de Žarden, Ekološka etika, 
Službeni glasnik, Beograd 2006, pp. 193-200. Consult also: J. McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2002, pp. 194-203. 
10 K. M. Meyer-Abich, Praktische Naturphilosophie, C. H. Beck, München 1997, s. 426. 
11 T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, University of California Press, Berkeley 2004, p. 243. 
12 Human dignity has often been linked to I. Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative: 
"Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at 
the same time as end and never merely as means". See: I. Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2002, pp. 46-47. Consult also: I. Eterović, Kant 
i bioetika, PERGAMENA, Cent. za int. bioet. Fil. fak. Sveuč. u Zagrebu, Zagreb 2017, pp. 104-110; Ž. 
Kaluđerović, "Bioethics and Hereditary Genetic Modifications", in: Conatus - Journal of Philosophy, 
Volume 3, Issue 1, Athens, Hellas, 2018, pp. 31-44. 
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the required legal equality of men and animals does not mean that life is equal to life 
in any case. Regan explains this with his famous example of a packed lifeboat in which 
there are several people and one big dog.13 It is assumed that the boat could be kept 
afloat only if one of the passengers would be thrown from the deck into the river or 
the sea. To the regret of all animal lovers and to the joy of all anthropocentrists, Regan 
"throws" the dog from the deck - surely with a heavy heart, but with the justification 
that the damage that death brings with it for one individual consists in the loss of its 
opportunities for life, and that these are greater for a man than for a dog. If a collision 
occurs, the value of the lives of different individuals must be measured, and 
individuals with more modest possibilities of experience should be scarified to the 
individuals with a wider life horizon and a higher value of life that goes with it. A 
common hierarchy of values that stems from the primacy of man remains unchanged 
if a disputable case arises.14 
 
Neither the circumstance that animals cannot take responsibility and cannot 
make autonomous decisions, from the point of view of non-anthropocentrists, does not 
have to be an obstacle to the approval of the appropriate "rights" to them. However, 
according to the anthropocentric concept of rights, a legal subject may only be a being 
that at the same time may be the subject of duty, which can therefore be conscious of 
its duties and which can fulfil them. The German philosopher L. Nelson in regards to 
the symmetry of the law and duty that reflects upon Kant, already at the beginning of 
the last century warned that for a certain legal subject is less constitutional to have the 
interests that could be injured than for some subject of duty. Following this, Nelson 
develops a maxim that speaks of Kant's categorical imperative, in the sense that one 
never acts so that he cannot approve of his method of action, and even if the interests 
affected by his actions are his own.15 This philosopher, by broadening Kant's concept 
of law, does not proceed towards the mind-governed person as the sole proprietor of 
rights, but introduces also all individuals that are governed solely by interests. All 
 
13 T. Regan, "The Dog in the Lifeboat: An Exchange". Internet address: 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1985/04/25/the-dog-in-the-lifeboat-an-exchange/. 
14 This does not mean that the notion of conflict can easily stretch to cases where a person wants to kill 
an animal to eat it, although he could be fed in another way. In other words, according to this 
interpretation, the basic right of the animal to life should have priority over the mere interest of man to 
eat with the greatest possible pleasure. A similar assessment can also be found in Singer, who condemns 
the killing of animals for the purpose of eating, unless it is necessary for the survival of man. 
15 L. Nelson, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 2. Aufl., s. 133, in: L. Nelson, Gesammelte Schriften in 
neun Bänden, hrsg. von P. Bernays, W. Eichler, A. Gysin, G. Heckmann, G. Henry-Hermann, F. von 
Hippel, S. Körner, W. Kroebel und G. Weisser, Band 4, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1972. 
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holders of interest are, according to Nelson, at the same time personalities. Then, he 
states that each person, as such, has dignity that is equal to the dignity of any other 
person. From this, the person's subjective right is exercised to respect its interests. 
According to this fundamental approach to personal dignity, any being who has 
interests, that is, every person, has the right to respect their interests. This right is the 
right of personality. Every person is a subject of law, because it is by its notion one 
subject of interest, it could be said on Nelson's trail.16 
Such clauses of the opening of an order on the equal treatment of human and 
animal interests make it acceptable and possible to recognize the "dignity" of animals 
and to install the "rights" of animals, without violating human dignity and human 
rights.17 Nevertheless, the acceptance of animals into the circle of right-holders leads 
to possible restrictions on the freedom of man, by a certain legal subject who, within 
the philosophical hierarchy of values, is placed below men. For this reason, certain 
experts in legal science (J. Caspar) discuss the issue of moral acceptability of animal 
"rights" in a culture that so far has not considered animals as "moral subjects of 
comparison".18 In other words, it should be seen on the basis of which legal - 
(bio)ethical reasons, a man allows to himself to be bound to the living beings that he 
has left behind in the history of the development of life. 
 
16 Nelson explicitly states that there is no general, philosophically grounded order that, because of the 
interests of animals, one should ignore one's own interests. Thus, it may very well be permissible to 
hurt the interests of an animal if it would be harmed by some prevailing interest of people. This, 
consequently, also applies in the case when it is not possible otherwise to preserve an interest in one's 
own life, or to maintain one's own spiritual and physical strength, but by destroying the life of an animal. 
L. Nelson, System der philosophischen Ethik und Pädagogik, 3. Aufl., s. 174, in: L. Nelson, Gesammelte 
Schriften in neun Bänden, hrsg. von P. Bernays, W. Eichler, A. Gysin, G. Heckmann, G. Henry-
Hermann, F. von Hippel, S. Körner, W. Kroebel und G. Weisser, Band 5, aus dem Nachlass hrsg. von 
G. Hermann und M. Specht, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1970. 
17 When Aristotle in Rhetoric (1373b6-17) talks about the special and general laws, the general laws he 
simply called natural laws. The explanation of natural laws is linked with general understandings of the 
just and unjust in harmony with nature, which, according to him, has been recognized by all nations. 
The Stagirites believes that with Empedocles it is just that very kind of law, i.e. that the philosopher 
from Agrigento referred to that right when he was forbidding to kill living beings, since it is impossible 
for ones to do that justly and the others to do that unjustly. Empedocles (and Pythagoras) claims 
(DK31B135) that for all living beings applies only one legal norm, and that those who had hurt a living 
creature shall receive punishments that cannot be redeemed. For more details consult: Ž. Kaluđerović, 
"Ancient Assumptions of Contemporary Considerations of Nature, Life and Non-Human Living 
Beings", forthcoming. 
18 J. Caspar, Tierschutz im Recht der modernen Industriegesellschaft, Nomos Verlaggesellschaft, 
Baden-Baden 1999, s. 154. 
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In this context, Caspar speaks of the modern concept of human dignity, which 
includes responsibility19 and empathy for creatures. A man who is capable of acting 
has brought animals into dependence to himself, and is therefore obliged to take care 
of their interests and the rights that arise from them. Man's autonomy has a mutual 
relationship with responsibility for his conduct. Without this responsibility there is no 
human dignity either. The greater the dependence of animals from the powerful-acting 
capable for self-determination man, the more actual becomes his responsibility. 
Another element of human dignity, which, according to Caspar, recommends 
the denial of freedom in favour of the animal "rights", exists in the quantum of 
compassion towards the weak, without pursuing own motives. They establish the 
conditions and contents of personal responsibility and lead the inner motive to 
overcome the egoism of individual needs and instincts, through the limitations of 
belonging to the group and beyond the boundaries of one's own species. Thus, they 
are the driving power of a type of ethics of solidarity, love for the neighbour, mercy, 
and that form of humanity that does not ask much for the price, but works. 
As an intermediary result of the digression on the consent of the new "animal 
ethics"20 with the usual anthropocentrism, it is possible to postulate this: 
a.) Animal "rights" at the expense of humans do not represent any contradiction 
to the symmetry of rights and duties in the usual (bio)ethics. Nelson's concept that any 
personal holder of interest can be a right holder whose interests should be treated the 
same as own interests, is a single systematic bridge between Singer’s and Regan’s 
views. 
b.) There are (bio)ethical reasons to give animals the "right" to a treatment that 
is appropriate to them, some would add to this the basic "right" to life, whereas in 
disputable cases man's right to survive is more valuable. 
c.) Restrictions on the action of man for the benefit of animals can rather be 
(bio)ethically justified as a fulfilment of responsibility and compassion for the weak.21 
 
 
19 For more details about the concept of responsibility see: I. R. Lerga, Bioetika i odgovornost u genetici, 
PERGAMENA, Zagreb 2007. 
20 About the concept of "Animal ethics" see: Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy 
(eds. J. B. Callicott, R. Frodeman), Macmillan Reference USA, Farmington Hills, MI, 2009, pp. 42-53. 
Consult also: D. Jamieson, Ethics and Environment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, pp. 
112-120. 
21 These examples and parts of comments have been taken and paraphrased from: K. Zajler, 
„Dostojanstvo životinja i zakoni ljudi”, pp. 9-15, in: Udruženje za zaštitu i prava životinja Sloboda za 
životinje, br. 1, Beograd, novembar 2006. 
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The question may be raised as to how this, by non-anthropocentrists 
increasingly (bio)ethically required "dignity" of animals, and the resulting animal 
"rights" are regulated, and whether they are aligned with the consideration of the 
"moral status" of animals. According to the "Law on Animal Welfare of the Republic 
of Serbia",22 Article 4, the basic principles of the protection of animal welfare23 are 
based on the mentioned pathocentric concept, since it focuses on the "universality of 
pain", and Article 2 states that the welfare of animals, that is regulated by this law,24 
refers to the "animals that can sense pain, suffering, fear and stress".25 When the 
second point of Article 4 of the Law stipulates that the principle of caring for animals 
"implies a moral obligation and the duty of man to respect the animals and take care 
of the life and welfare of animals",26 it only shows that it is the obligation of man to 
protect animals, and it does not entitle the animals the "right" to that protection. This, 
therefore, refers to the moral duty of man, and not to the "right" of the animals.27 The 
rights holder can only be a man, because he alone has the dignity of personality, which 
is an attitude that is in accordance with the usual anthropocentric theses, and it does 
not differ much from the majority of similar norms in other European countries.28 
 
22 The Law was posted on the website of the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Management and Forestry 
of the Republic of Serbia on 19 January 2009 and became effective on 10 June 2009. „Zakon o dobrobiti 
životinja Republike Srbije”. Internet address: 
http://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_dobrobiti_zivotinja.html. 
23 Animal welfare is usually, however estimated based on internationally accepted concept of the so-
called "Five Freedoms". Internet address: 
http://www.aspcapro.org/sites/pro/files/aspca_asv_five_freedoms_final_0_0.pdf. Similar views are 
stated in the point 4 of Article 5 of the "Law on Animal Welfare of the Republic of Serbia". „Zakon o 
dobrobiti životinja Republike Srbije”. Internet address: 
http://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_dobrobiti_zivotinja.html. In London, for example, already in 
1824 the first society for the prevention of cruelty to animals was established, whereas a regulation 
pertaining to animal welfare in the UK was adopted in 1911, and, including numerous amendments, it 
is still in force today. 
24 On the relationship of the "rights" of animals and "welfare" of animals see: D. Marić, Etika životinja, 
Zalihica, Sarajevo 2010, str. 195-217. 
25 „Zakon o dobrobiti životinja Republike Srbije”. Internet address: 
http://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_dobrobiti_zivotinja.html. 
26 „Zakon o dobrobiti životinja Republike Srbije”. Internet address: 
http://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_dobrobiti_zivotinja.html. 
27 Consult: E. D. Protopapadakis, "Animal Rights, or Just Human Wrongs?", pp. 279-291, in: Animal 
Ethics Past and Present Perspectives (ed. E. D. Protopapadakis), Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH, Berlin 
2012. 
28 For example, "Zakon o zaštiti životinja Republike Hrvatske" ("Law on Animal Protection of the 
Republic of Croatia")  (Internet address: https://narodne-
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Article 7, paragraph 1, of the "Law on Animal Welfare of the Republic of 
Serbia" states that it is forbidden "to abuse animals", while in paragraph 3 of the same 
Article it is prohibited to "deprive an animal of life, except in cases and in the manner 
prescribed by this Law".29 Such argumentation is substantially getting closer to the 
recognition of the "dignity" of animals. Of course, the trouble with such regulations is 
an animal is not a legal subject pursuant to the laws of the state, and therefore it cannot 
even sue anyone, despite the law on their welfare being adopted in the Serbian 
Parliament. Lawsuits cannot be filed on behalf of injured parties that are cows, pigs or 
hens, since they are animals, and animals cannot participate in any court proceedings. 
Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Law states that the owner or holder of the animal 
is obliged to "treat the animal with the care of a prudent owner and to provide 
conditions for keeping and care of animals that correspond to the species, breed, sex, 
age, as well as physical, biological and production specifics and characteristics of the 
behaviour and health of the animal; ... The owner or keeper of the animal is responsible 
for the life, health and welfare of the animal and must take all necessary measures to 
ensure that no unnecessary pain, suffering, fear and stress or injury is inflicted on the 
animals".30 Despite this very well-conceived and harmonized with the highest 
European standards text,31 the life of animals in the stays or their position during 
transport is still quite poor. The answer to why this is so partly lies in the fact that there 
is no concretization of general legal norms of such laws in the legislation, and partly 
because the adopted regulations limit the minimum standards that are not consistent 
 
novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2017_10_102_2342.html), "Zakon o zaštiti i dobrobiti životinja Bosne i 
Hercegovine" ("Law on Animal Protection and Welfare of Bosnia and Herzegovina") (Internet address: 
http://vfs.unsa.ba/web/images/dokumenti/Zako_o_zastiti_i_dobrobiti_zivotinja.pdf), or "Zakon o 
zaštiti dobrobiti životinja Crne Gore" ("Law on Animal Protection and Welfare of Montenegro") 
(Internet address: http://www.sluzbenilist.me/PravniAktDetalji.aspx?tag=%7B92A63CC4-3155-
49BD-BB32-EC9624638EB3%7D). 
29 „Zakon o dobrobiti životinja Republike Srbije”. Internet address: 
http://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_dobrobiti_zivotinja.html. 
30 „Zakon o dobrobiti životinja Republike Srbije”. Internet address: 
http://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_dobrobiti_zivotinja.html. 
31 The last around fifty years on the European continent were marked by dramatic changes in the area 
of ethical-moral and legal-political regulation of the protection and welfare of animals. They are the 
result of legislative activities of individual states as well as of the transposition into the national 
legislation of a large number of relevant documents adopted under the auspices of the European Council 
and the various decisions of the bodies of European Union, and of the standardizing of the legislations 
of European countries. For more detailed consultations on the perspectives and achievements of 
bioethical institutionalization in the European Union see: I. Rinčić, Europska bioetika: ideje i 
institucije, PERGAMENA, Zagreb 2011. 
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with the high goals that are postulated by such laws. Regardless of the fact that the 
Law is "a matter of general interest", because the need for it is imposed by the process 
of integration of the Republic of Serbia into the European Union and harmonization 
of the regulations with the EU directives, in itself it does not prohibit any injury or 
damage to animal health, but only prohibits "stunning, or depriving the animal of life 
contrary to the provisions of this Law".32 After all, Article 15 of the Law sets out the 
nine bases on which an animal may be deprived of life "in a human manner". These 
include points 3 and 4, according to which an animal can be slaughtered if it is to be 
used for food, and if it is used for scientific and biomedical purposes. In the collision 
of rights, traders of cattle and scientific institutions are favoured, since they can rely 
on their basic rights to freely exercise their own profession, as well as to the freedom 
of scientific research,33 namely to the rights guaranteed to them by the highest legal 
act of the state, the Constitution,34 while the "Law on Animal Welfare" is an act of a 
lower ontological rank, that is, a derived act. 
If a (bio)ethical right should be legally perceived as well, it must be possible 
for it to be sought by court, i.e. the owner of the right must either personally, or if he 
cannot do so, through a guardian or other legal representative, file a lawsuit before the 
court for violation of his rights, and possibly procure an exemption. For animals, this 
is not currently foreseen,35 although, for example, Article 1 of the "Law on Animal 
Welfare of the Republic of Serbia" states: "This law regulates the welfare of animals, 
rights, obligations and responsibilities of legal and physical persons, i.e. entrepreneurs, 
for the welfare of animals, treatment of animals and protection of animals against 
abuse ..."36 
 
32 „Zakon o dobrobiti životinja Republike Srbije”. Internet address: 
http://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_dobrobiti_zivotinja.html. 
33 The society truly has a complex task to balance between the scientific freedom of research and the 
responsibility of preserving social norms and social values. "Scientific freedom ... is an acquired right, 
generally approved by society as necessary for the advancement of knowledge from which society may 
benefit". But "scientific freedom and responsibility are basically inseparable". Consult: AAAS 
Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington DC 1975, p. 5. Internet address: 
https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/SRHRL/PDF/1975-ScientificFreedomResponsibility.pdf. 
34 See: „Ustav Republike Srbije” ("Constitution of the Republic of Serbia"), Kanc. za sarad. s med. 
Vlade Republike Srbije, Beograd 2006, p. 19, 22, 26. 
35 Consult: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/08/07/european-seal-herd-
perishing/232cffdb-9d38-4fee-b710-bf371965ad06/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9408f6d6c3f6; 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/chronology-of-mad-cow-crisis/. 
36 „Zakon o dobrobiti životinja Republike Srbije”. Internet address: 
http://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_dobrobiti_zivotinja.html. 
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If there is an intention to really take care of the protection of animals, it is 
certainly not enough to devote to them one state goal that protects them so to say 
indirectly; instead, according to non-anthropocentrists, they should be given the 
"rights" that are similar to basic rights, to which a lawyer could refer to on their behalf 
when filing a lawsuit, and which can directly compete with the basic rights of 
scientists, meat producers and those who carry out the transport of animals. How could 
these basic "rights" of animals look like? 
Firstly, they should be granted the "right" of respect for their animal 
"dignity",37 "the right" that will protect them from abuse in experiments. The conflict 
between monkeys, dogs and cats harassed in experimental laboratories, on the one 
hand, and the interests of medicine, pharmaceutical industry, and researchers on the 
other hand, could induce people to finally seriously assess whether animal suffering38 
is in a proper relationship to the benefit for man that comes out of it. In this assessment, 
it will be also significant whether the dignity of man justifies to deprive other living 
beings of their "dignity" in order to carry out sometimes suspicious experiments on 
them, whose results can often not even be applied to man. 
Animals should, furthermore, be guaranteed the basic "right" to life 
appropriate to their species, the view that is based on the parts of the fourth and fifth 
articles of the "Universal Declaration of Animal Rights": "Wild animals have the right 
to live and reproduce in freedom their own natural environment ... Any animal which 
is dependent on man has the right to proper sustenance and care".39 
This also applies to the fundamental "right" of animals to life. As long as 
modern societies are meat-eating societies, it will be possible only to gradually 
implement this basic "right" of animals and therefore anchor it only in the vicinity of 
closer legal regulations. This basic "right" would primarily prohibit the excessive 
production of animals for slaughter, which then also leads to their destruction. Then, 
in order to gradually achieve the protection of life for the benefit of animals, a different 
programming of eating habits of new generations of people would have to occur.40 
 
37 Justified care of the protection of non-human living beings does not mean that the author of this paper 
considers that some kind of "moral status" should be recognized for animals, that would be in 
conformity to the human moral phenomena. Taking care of all current and future "rights" of animals, 
in the end, is essentially a human task. 
38 Consult: https://www.worldanimalprotection.org/. 
39 "Universal Declaration of Animal Rights". Internet address: http://www.esdaw.eu/unesco.html. 
40 Consult: Ž. Kaluđerović, „Presokratske anticipacije ne-antropocentrizma”, pp. 151-170, in: ARHE, 
god. XIII, br. 25, Novi Sad 2016. 
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In guaranteeing the basic "rights" to animals, which, in addition to determining 
the state's goal, should also enter into the Constitution,41 all of this could be taken into 
consideration together with the statement that any vertebrate has the right to have its 
dignity respected, and to a life that is suitable to its species. According to this 
interpretation, man would be permitted to intervene only for reasons of public interest, 
certainly within the framework of the law.42 The first of these two sentences, in which 
in the form of a basic "right" animals are granted the "right" to "dignity" and life 
appropriate to the species, would probably mean that the keeping of animals in 
massive farming, which is being practiced today, due to the Constitution would have 
to, at some point be abolished and replaced by keeping animals in the manner 
appropriate to their species. The second sentence, according to which man is permitted 
to interfere in the life of animals for reasons of public interest, would be a regulation 
between the absolute protection of the life of animals and the relative readiness of a 
society which to some degree tortures animals, to take care of this protection of life. 
Movement of the society in that direction should represent an intention of the state 
which is to protect the animals, which is connected with the continuous flow of smaller 
and larger steps of the legislator, who will take care of that state's goal by promoting 
the appropriate way of life. 
All this can seem pretty utopian, but time will show if people are mature for 
such a step in evolution. The present ecological, and not only ecological, crisis urges 
mankind to, among other things, determine in a new way its attitude towards animals. 
Homo sapiens is the first species that has ever been able to freely decide whether they 
will give up eating other living beings. The first step has been made - people have 
ceased to eat each other for a long time, and cannibalism is barely present in the so-
called "primitive" nations. Whether man will soon make a second step by stopping to 
eat animals, to respect the fundamental "right" animal to life? It is unlikely that this 
will happen in the foreseeable future, but this does not mean that we should not 
continue to work on strengthening the protection and welfare of non-human living 
beings. 
 
 
 
 
 
41 On the basis of the 1992 plebiscite, in Switzerland, the Constitution guarantees the inherent value of 
animals, i.e. it already speaks of "dignity of creation" ("die Würde der Kreatur"). 
42 In order to make this proposal be legally and dogmatically viable and practical for implementation, 
it would be necessary to implement a specific and serious research. 
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